In a previous blog, I wrote about the global rise in export restrictions on critical raw materials.  In the modern world of greatly increased geopolitical tensions, securing reliable access to critical minerals is becoming a key economic security consideration, vital to the success of the energy transition. However, currently, more than half of energy-related minerals are subject to some form of export controls and those restrictions are increasing in number and expanding in scope to cover not just raw and refined materials but also processing technologies, with implications for the smooth functioning of global supply chains.

The Role of Electric Vehicles in the Energy Transition

Electric vehicles play a vital role in reducing oil demand – and hence carbon emissions.  According to the IEA, in 2024, EVs displaced over 1.3 mb/d of oil in 2024 (equivalent to Japan’s entire transport sector oil demand today) – a 30% year-on-year increase. By 2030, EVs are projected to displace over 5 mb/d of diesel and gasoline.  Their impact on electricity demand is equally remarkable.  According to the same IEA report, in 2024, EVs globally consumed around 180 TWh of electricity (more than the annual electricity consumption of Argentina), representing a 60% increase on 2023.   

So Electric vehicles are key to the success of the energy transition.  And key to the success of the EV revolution is creating and maintaining access to reliable supplies of those rare earth metals and minerals on which EVs and their batteries depend (as well as the power lines, transformers, transmission cables and wind turbines that will create and transport the electricity). According to the IEA, EV battery deployment and storage applications, construction and the electrification of grids and industrial equipment between 2024-2040 will drive a fivefold increase in lithium demand; a doubling in demand for graphite and nickel; a 50-60% increase in demand for cobalt; and a 30% increase in demand for copper.

Mining Investment Response to Demand Signals – Perhaps too Effective?

The IEA calculates that the investment needed to meet this demand will be around USD 500 billion in new capital investment in mining between now and 2040, reflecting not only the scale of demand growth, but also the increasing capital intensity for new projects, driven partly by declining ore quality, particularly in more mature markets such as copper. 

The mining sector has already responded efficiently to this demand signal, with the production increase of battery metals at twice the typical rate seen in the late 2010s highlighting the sector’s ability to respond to demand signals more quickly than has been possible for ‘traditional’ metals (like copper and zinc). However, major supply increases in China, Indonesia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo have resulted in significant price reductions – lithium has fallen by over 80% since 2023, with graphite, cobalt and nickel prices falling by between 10 – 20% in 2024.

Whilst these price decreases are welcome in the short term, making batteries cheaper and bringing down the overall price of an electric car, they are not providing the right price signal to incentivise longer-term investment (lithium mines take an average of 16.5 years to develop).  Despite projections showing increased demand into the 2030s, mining spending only rose by 5% in 2024 (down from 14% in 2023).  And, although exploration spending continued to rise for lithium, uranium and copper, it declined for nickel, cobalt and zinc. The IEA’s projections show serious gaps between demand and supply by 2040 – depressing reading for those of us who believe that the energy transition cannot go fast enough.

Raw Materials and Processing is Overly Geographically Concentrated

And, unfortunately, the bad news does not stop there. The concentration of rare earths and metals in both mining and processing sectors has continued apace.  The average market share of the top three mining countries for key energy minerals rose from 73% in 2020 to 77% in 2024 and the average market share of the top three refining nations increased from 82% in 2020 to 86% in 2024 with 90% of supply growth coming from single suppliers – Indonesia (for nickel) and China (for cobalt, graphite and rare earths).

The geographical concentration of mining and refining poses a severe risk to global supply chains.  A few figures demonstrate this fragility.

• 93% of global lithium is mined in Australia, Chile, China and Argentina.
• 50% of global nickel is mined in Indonesia.
• 66% of global cobalt is mined in the DRC.
• 80% of global graphite is mined in China.

• 65% of global lithium is refined in China (and another 25% in Chile).
• 60% of the world’s nickel is refined in China and Indonesia.
• 75% of all cobalt is refined in China.
• 90% of the global graphite supply is refined in China.
• 84% of the world’s nickel is refined in China.
• 90% of the world’s RRE is refined in China.
• China produces 80% of global battery cells (even if all the other giga-factories come on line, China’s market share will only decline to 70% by 2030).
• China supplies almost 85% of global cathode active materials.
• China supplies over 90% of anode active materials.
• China controls 80% of lithium hydroxide output.

Global Lithium Supply is Constrained.

Lithium is key to the continued growth of the EV sector – demand is projected to grow by 500% by 2040. In 2023 annual demand for lithium was approximately 180,000 tons (a 27% increase on 2022).  In 2024, annual demand for lithium rose to 220,000 tonnes (a 29% increase on 2023).  The rate of lithium production increase is slowing and production is only just keeping pace with demand – 204,000 tonnes in 2023 (an increase of 23% from 2022) and 240,000 tonnes in 2024 (an 18% increase from 2023). The IEA projects that lithium demand will reach 700,000 tonnes by 2035, with supply from existing and announced mining projects only meeting 60% of that projected demand.

Given the efficacity of EVs in hydrocarbon displacement, they have become central to the energy transition. Reaching Net Zero by 2050 will require the production of around 2 billion EVs, which will require 16-20 million tonnes of lithium – or 100 million tonnes of lithium carbonate equivalent (LCE).   Since estimates of total global lithium supply hover around 22 million (105 million tonnes of LCE), there will be a severe supply crunch by the middle of the next decade, a crunch compounded by the fact that over half of today’s lithium production is in areas with high water stress or in areas liable to flooding (it takes 2.2 tons of water to make a ton of lithium).

The supply outlook for cobalt and copper is similarly alarming, with existing mines and projects under construction estimated to meet only 50% of projected cobalt requirements and 80% of copper needs by 2035.

What does this mean for Electric Vehicles?

According to the IEA, a typical EV requires six times the mineral inputs of a conventional car – a battery-electric vehicle contains around 207 kg of critical minerals (copper, lithium, nickel, manganese, cobalt, graphite, rare earths), compared to around 30–40 kg for a conventional vehicle, so a reliable supply of these materials is essential to the success of the EV industry.  

And the EV market is growing fast. In 2024, globally, over 17 million EVs were sold – a year-on-year increase of 25%. To give those figures some context, the difference between EV sales in 2024 and EV sales in 2023 was 3.5 million.  This difference is greater than the total number of electric car sold in 2020.  China continues to be the main driver (pardon the pun) of this growth, with annual EV car sales up by 40% in 2024 (again, to put that figure in some sort of context, the 11 million EVs sold in China last year is greater than the entire number of EVs sold worldwide in 2022).  In 2021, China accounted for half of global electric car sales.  By 2024, that figure was almost 66%, with EVs accounting for almost 50% of new cars being sold in China. By contrast, in Europe EV sales accounted for only about 20% of new car sales as sales growth slowed due to the phase out and reduction of subsidies and the lack of change in EU CO₂ targets for cars between 2023 and 2024.  There were some notable exceptions – in the UK 30% of all new cars sold in 2024 were EVs, up from 24% in 2023. And in Norway, the figure has reached 88%. EV sales growth in the US continued, but at around only 25% of the growth in 2023.  Interestingly, outside China, the EU and the US, EV sales grew by 40% in 2024, reaching 1.3 million new cars – just shy of the 1.6 million new EVs sold in the US in 2024.  

Electric vehicle demand obviously has an impact on battery demand, with EVs accounting for around 90% of the 1 TWh of battery demand recorded in 2024 (to put that figure in context, one average week’s demand in 2024 exceeded the total demand for an entire year in 2014).  By 2030, demand is projected to triple to reach 3 TWh, but current plans for 282 new giga-factories to come online worldwide by 2031, which would add around 5.8 TWh of additional battery capacity.

Since the most major component (and therefore cost) of an EV is its battery, the impact of raw material surpluses (and the projected future shortfall) is crucial for EV manufacturers. As noted above, high lithium supply levels pushed prices down in 2024 – prices for lithium-ion battery packs fell 20% in 2024, despite lithium demand in 2024 being about six times bigger than in 2015.  The low prices not only send an unhelpful price signal for longer term investment (introducing supply shock risk), but they also disincentivise new market entrants, which increases the level of raw material production concentration among established players.  And for EV producers, the high geographical and ownership concentration of processing in their supply chain increases the geopolitical and market distortion risk.

Although there are alternatives to lithium-ion batteries in the shape of sodium-ion and solid-state batteries, the technology is not (yet) widespread enough to reduce the risk of lithium under-supply to the market in the middle of the next decade.  And, whilst battery recycling will play a role in curbing cost increases, limitations on feedstock mean that it will take at least a decade until recycling plays a major part in reducing primary mineral demand – and even then, the IEA calculates that recycling used batteries would only could cut lithium supply requirements by about 10% by 2040.

And growing political risk is already exacerbating these supply side risks. Governments increasingly identify rare earth elements (RRE) and minerals as strategic industries, crucial to national security and are accordingly devising strategies to protect their national interests.  The rise of economic nationalism will do nothing to slow this phenomenon. The Australian government  established funds to support companies breaking into the market; the UK published its Critical Minerals Strategy in July 2022; and the EU’s Critical Raw Materials Act is aimed at stimulating EU production; designating key strategic projects for accelerated permitting; creating a one-stop shop for project authorisations; and encouraging measures to speed up national legal processes.  Access to raw materials became a flashpoint in the trade dispute between the US and China.

Conclusion

Electric vehicles have a vital role to play in the energy transition as the only realistic alternative to hydrocarbon transport that can currently be deployed at scale. Their efficacity at displacing diesel and petrol is already apparent.  However, EVs face a growing number of inter-related issues which potentially threaten their ability to play that role in the longer term.

Rising geopolitical tensions that increasingly characterise modern international relations (from invasions and border disputes in Europe, the Middle East and Asia, coup d’etats and rising Russian influence in the Sahel, to US-China economic and diplomatic strains) mean that competition for access to critical raw materials will increase – an acute competition which will be exacerbated by the coming supply crunch in the critical materials necessary for producing EV batteries. The geographical concentration of both production and processing compounds the geopolitics, not least as access to critical raw materials becomes a national security issue.  On top of these inter-connected risks, as producer countries seek to move up the value chain, export of (and therefore access to) critical raw materials will be affected, with Western companies increasingly caught in the cross-fire and subject to mis-and dis-information campaigns by hostile state actors seeking to ingratiate themselves with producer state governments in order to displace Western companies with their own.

Given this daunting combination of geopolitical and supply chain risks, it would not be surprising to find that the lifespan of EV market-dominance is limited.  Indeed, the compounding of risk suggests that, by the middle of the next decade, demand for alternative zero-emission vehicles, including hydrogen-powered cars, may overtake EV demand, meaning that the hundreds of millions of dollars of investment in bringing EVs to the market may face a much shorter pay-back period than had originally been envisaged by investors.

This fearsome combination of factors has significant implications for EV producers, miners and consumers alike.  Being able to navigate these ever-more complex geopolitical waters will mean the difference between commercial success and failure.

As the energy transition gathers pace, the need to access the essential raw materials which underpin it is also accelerating.  Some basic statistics evidence this demand:

• An electric car needs six times more rare earth minerals than a conventional vehicle;
• An onshore wind plant needs nine times more materials than a comparable gas facility;
• Between 2017 and 2022, the energy sector drove a tripling of global demand for lithium, whilst demand for cobalt and nickel rose by 70% and 40% [i] respectively;
• Between three to 6.5 billion tonnes of transitional minerals will be needed over the next three decades if the world is to meet its climate goals[ii].

The current and future global demand for transitional metals and minerals offers a potentially huge economic opportunity[iii]. This is particularly the case for Africa, where more than 50% of the world’s cobalt and manganese, 92% of its platinum and significant quantities of lithium and copper are to be found. Almost all of the continent’s current output is presently shipped as ore for processing in third countries (primarily China), meaning the potential economic benefit of this enormous mineral wealth has not filtered through to the real economics in its African source countries[iv].  Africa exports roughly 75% of its crude oil, which is refined elsewhere and re-imported as (more expensive) petroleum products; and exports 45% of its natural gas, whilst 600 million Africans have no access to electricity (approximately 53% of the continent’s population)[v].

A number of African governments have expressed their determination to avoid repeating the ‘resource curse’ mistakes of the past, by using the continent’s natural resources to drive domestic economic growth, while creating meaningful domestic job opportunities, rather than exporting them and the consequent economic growth elsewhere.  This approach has led a number of African countries to impose export restrictions on raw minerals; promote domestic processing; and demand that agreements with third countries promote technology transfers and improve domestic processing capacities and workforce skills.

Whilst African countries are absolutely right to want to retain more of the commercial and economic benefit of their natural resources for the development of their own countries, rather than enriching third-party processor nations, the move to protect national resources in this manner has coincided with a global move towards protectionism and a rise in great-power competition which has made the race for the raw materials necessary to power the energy transition even more acute.  This competition can be seen in President Trump’s ‘interest’ in the natural resources of Greenland, Canada and Ukraine.  And in the tense negotiations which have played out in London over the past few days between the US and China over access to processed critical minerals. 

And as the Great Power competition heats up, there is a growing risk that Western extractives companies become collateral becoming leverage.  Russian influence in the Sahel Region of Africa has already been effective in pushing Western companies out and replacing them with Russian companies.  There is some evidence of Chinese government influence in other parts of Africa pursuing a similar path, using influence which ranges from disinformation campaigns aimed at damaging companies’ reputations and bottom-lines, to offers of ‘no-strings-attached’ mining contracts which are not subject to (Western-imposed) compliance and BHR requirements.

Sustainable use of transition minerals

But, leaving geopolitical machinations aside for a moment, and returning to equitable access to resources there is a story to also tell about how African governments are planning to avoid a new ‘Scramble for Africa’ and secure the benefits of the demand for critical raw materials and rare earth minerals for the development and economic progress of their own countries.

In February 2024 a Resolution to promote equitable benefit-sharing from extraction and calling for the sustainable use of transitional minerals was presented UN environmental assembly in Nairobi. The Resolution, which was supported by a group of mainly African countries including the DRC, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Cameroon and Chad, was described as being ‘crucial for African countries, the environment and the future of [African nations’] populations.”[vi] The UNSG in a press release[vii]  dated 26 April, 2024 noted and accepted the importance of using the energy transition and the race to secure the raw materials critical to its success to ‘create jobs, diversify economies, and dramatically boost revenues’ in resource-rich developing countries.

And (quite rightly) many African countries are not waiting for the West’s permission, but have already taken steps to protect their natural resources and move up the processing value chain[viii].   This trend is only likely to accelerate.

African Protection of Natural Resources

Tanzania

Under its 2017 The Natural Wealth and Resources (Permanent Sovereignty) Act[ix], every company extracting natural resources in Tanzania must give the Government a minimum of 16% free carried interest. The law also gives the government the right to acquire more shares based on the level of investment and strategic importance of the project — up to 50% or more in some cases.  The 16% share provision gives Tanzania a say in decision-making, board representation, and direct profit-sharing from the mining companies.  This legal provision was the basis for the formation in January 2021 of the Kabanga nickel-cobalt project joint venture ensuring domestic ownership in a major, strategic battery-metal mine.

Zambia 

In January 2021, the state-owned mining firm ZCCM-IH took control of Mopani Copper Mines (previously majority-owned by Glencore) paying $1.5 billion to effectively nationalise the copper-cobalt operation. This move was designed to keep the strategic asset in national hands and secure more revenue for Zambia.

Burundi

In July 2021, the government suspended the operations of several foreign mining companies – notably Rainbow Rare Earths’ Gakara mine – citing “unbalanced” contracts and arguing that the State was not getting its fair share. At the same time, Burundi also halted rare earth concentrate exports (Burundi operates the only rare-earth minerals mine in Africa) and demanded contract renegotiations so that more profits benefit the country.  The Mines Minister commented that “The State, which owns the soil and minerals, is not making a profit as it should,” and set out an intention to ‘[re]renegotiate…these agreements for the benefit of the people, because these minerals must be used to finance the development of the country.’

Nigeria

In July 2022[x], Nigeria banned the export of raw-ore to (in the words of its Natural Resources Minister) end the “plundering (of) the continent for raw materials” by incentivising local processing or refining before exporting and “…bring industry to Africa so that our people can be employed.”

Zimbabwe

In December 2022, in response to a global boom in lithium demand, Zimbabwe banned the export of raw lithium ore. The Mining Minister announced that no lithium-bearing ores or unbeneficiated lithium could be exported without written permission, in order ‘to spur domestic value addition and battery manufacturing in Zimbabwe’.

In January 2023, the government extended the lithium ore ban to all unprocessed base mineral ores (including nickel, chromium, manganese and tantalite). Companies with local processing facilities are exempted, reflecting a policy to retain more mineral value domestically.

Namibia

In June 2023, Namibia’s Cabinet approved a ban on exporting unprocessed critical minerals, including crushed lithium ore, cobalt, manganese, graphite, dysprosium and terbium – although, with special ministerial approval, it is still possible to export small quantities of these minerals. The government noted that, with high global demand for battery metals, Namibia was determined to ensure that it recouped some of the value by requiring such minerals to be at least partially processed in Namibia. This ban is of particular concern to the EU, coming just eight months after the EU signed an MoU with Namibia aimed at securing the bloc’s access to rare earth minerals.

Namibia is also one of the world’s top uranium producers, but the ban does not appear to extend to uranium.

Ghana

In July 2023, Ghana’s government adopted a “Green Minerals Policy” (aka Minerals of the Future policy) that prohibits the export of raw lithium and other green minerals[xi]. The cabinet decision (July 27, 2023) aims to “retain a significant proportion of the value chain” in-country by mandating local processing before export.

In February 2024, Ghana’s President announced a further series of measures to extract greater value from its natural resources, including:

• the construction of a refinery dedicated to processing locally-produced manganese;
• a prohibition on the export of raw bauxite[xii] (following Indonesia’s 2023 bauxite export ban) lithium and iron ore;
• the prioritization of Ghanaian investors in acquiring Newmont Corporation’s Akyem gold mine[xiii] and Atlantic Lithium’s Ewoyaa lithium project;
• the creation of a 400-kilogram capacity gold refinery.

Botswana

In July 2023, Botswana renegotiated its mining rights with De Beers to increase the share of rough stones it receives, create a dedicated diamond fund to be used for investment in “additional value to the Botswana economy”;[xiv] and require De Beers to invest in and develop the domestic diamond valule-chain.

The Sahel

Since 2020, there have been coups d’états in Sudan, Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Niger, Chad and Gabon. These seven countries are important sources of gold[xv], uranium[xvi], bauxite[xvii], manganese[xviii] and iron ore.

Niger

After seizing power in July 2023, the Nigerien military junta imposed a moratorium on all State export contracts, with the intention of reviewing them to ‘improve their commercial fairness’ – a provision which includes pegging prices of exported minerals to trading prices quoted on international bourses. In December 2024, the State back control of a French-operated Uranium mine, after having refused to renew its licence in June 2024.

Guinea

Since mid-2023, the Guinean Government has revoked, repossessed or cancelled over 220 mining licences for raw materials including bauxite, gold, diamonds, graphite, and iron.  These interventions have mainly targeted smaller operators and (so far) have been focused on under-developed or underperforming licenses. The Government has explained its actions as aimed at “freeing unused resources for other investors’ by reissuing those areas to more serious developers.  The government has also exerted pressure on major bauxite exporters to commit to building local alumina refineries. 

The pressure on mining companies appears to be part of Guinea’s push to ensure mining assets are actively exploited and contributing to the economy, rather than held speculatively. So far, the Guinean government has avoided the major operators, but it may feel emboldened by the lack of market reaction to take more aggressive action against them in the future.

Mali

In August 2023, the ruling junta enacted a new Mining Code allowing the state to take up to 30% ownership in any new mining project (10% free equity plus an optional 20% purchase within two years). The code also eliminated certain tax exemptions for foreign mining firms. While Mali is a major gold producer, the reforms were driven mainly by new lithium projects coming on-line (with, at 14% of continental production, Mali set to become Africa’s second largest lithium producer). The government has explicitly stated its intention to ensure that the sale of its lithium accurately reflects the value of the product on international markets.

DRC

In February 2025, the Democratic Republic of Congo – source of 78% of the world’s cobalt – announced a four-month ban on cobalt exports due to an “overabundance of supply on the international market,” with authorities hinting at possible longer-term restrictions (quotas, tariffs or extending the ban). Similarly with other decisions taken by African Governments, the decision reflects the DRC’s increasing desire to ensure that the country gains a greater domestic benefit from its raw materials production.  The four-month period expires later this month – it is still not clear whether the DRC Government will allow unrestricted export of raw cobalt following the expiry of the ban.

What is Driving this Phenomenon?

a. Geopolitics

Political uncertainty often complicates operating conditions for international mining companies.  Foreign mining companies are often portrayed as agents of foreign states, which can create difficulty in renewing contracts or obtaining permits.

Russia regularly hosts Russia–Africa Summits, at which it contrasts its no-strings “sovereignty” and security deals to those offered by Western companies/governments. Russia has leveraged (possibly fomented) insecurity in the Sahel, exchanging military backing and security support for minerals and encouraging the expulsion of Western troops[xix]. Russia’s willingness to undertake such transactional deals is only likely to increase the importance of its role in Sahel countries, whilst the growing links between China, Russia and Iran present serious security issues for Western governments – for example with regards to access to Uranium[xx].  This in turn may increase the complexity of operating in those countries as greater Russia involvement in Africa brings with it increased political risk.

Evidence of Russian interference against Western mining and extractives companies is strongest in The Sahel Region:

• Mali. Since the 2021 coup, Mali’s junta (backed by Wagner) has strongly pressured Western gold miners. In 2024 it detained Barrick Gold and Resolute Mining staff over contract disputes and seized gold stockpiles, forcing Barrick to freeze operations and pay a reported $438 million to resume mining. Wagner-linked operators encouraged Malian officials to nationalize or renegotiate lucrative gold contracts in favor of Russian interests.
• Niger. After Niger’s 2023 coup, the military government acted against French nuclear mining firm Orano. In July 2024 Niger revoked Orano’s permit at one of its uranium mines (for allegedly failing to resume production after militant attacks). This coincided with Russian state group Rosatom negotiating to take over Niger’s uranium assets. By late 2024 Niger’s mining minister was publicly courting Russian companies for uranium exploration.
• Burkina Faso. Burkina’s 2022 military government has shifted decisively away from Western partners. In April 2025 it awarded a new industrial gold licence on the Kourweogo (Niou) deposit to Russia’s Nordgold. This move, amid high gold prices, “signals deepening economic ties between Russia and Burkina Faso” and a pivot to Moscow over traditional Western allies.

But there is also evidence of growing Russian influence in resource nationalism decisions taken in other African countries:

• The Central African Republic.  Since 2018. Russian paramilitaries (the Wagner Group – now re-named the Africa Corps) have secured gold and diamond mining concessions in return for protecting CAR’s government in a form of State Capture where economic and political benefits flow to Russian-linked entities rather than the population.
• Sudan.  Since 2017, The Wagner Group have ‘protected’ gold, uranium, and diamond sites. Contracts, such as with “Meroe Gold,” grant Russian firms strategic mining access.
• Libya and Madagascar.  Russian paramilitary groups initially provided security and then subsequently acquired mineral assets — chromium in Madagascar and gold & diamonds in Libya.
• Mozambique. The Wagner Group (and subsequently the Africa Corps signed security agreements with the Governments, in return receiving mining and natural resource concessions (mainly in gold, diamonds, uranium, and rare earth minerals).
• Zimbabwe. The Government has been fairly explicit in replacing Western mining partners with Russian ones. In 2019 the government licensed only Russia’s state-controlled Alrosa (and China’s Anjin) to explore new diamond concessions, excluding firms like De Beers. The Mines Minister confirmed that De Beers and other Western companies were “not among those licensed” – a policy which effectively prevented renewal or extension of Western companies’ diamond licences and created space for Russian entrants.

b. African Solutions

However, in many other African countries where Governments have taken the decision to revoke, rescind or refuse licence renewal, the explication is domestic. African governments are keen to avoid the “resource curse” (by restricting or banning mineral exports) and move up the value chain (by boosting domestic processing) to increase domestic value extraction from mining and resource wealth.  From the perspective of the African government and society, this harder-nosed approach makes good sense in an era where, following agreement at COP28 to triple global renewables capacity and double energy efficiency, global demand for critical and rare earth minerals is only going to increase. Done right, it will ensure a better-educated and more economically-participative workforce, engaged in higher-value economic activities. And will avoid raw materials being exported for a low price and its processed final form being re-imported at a higher price (imposing both an unnecessary cost and loss to the local economy).

The approach is not without risk.  Foreign mining companies, whose expertise is arguably key to commercial success, will demand certainty about: political risk; the presence of mineral processing infrastructure (including freight and port facilities); a stable electrical supply; a battery value chain; reliable legal frameworks (including ESG protections); and sound financial management, ensuring effective use of tax revenues. Without those reassurances and the accompanying infrastructure, export bans could have a chilling effect on or divert foreign investment.  The DRC cobalt ban has already forced battery producers to intensify their research into alternative component materials.

International Support

The African Union is developing an African Green Minerals Strategy[xxi], which aims to improve mining regulation and institutions, and build a more attractive investment environment.   And some African countries have begun to cooperate across international borders to strengthen African collaboration in developing domestic processing expertise – in 2022 the DRC and Zambia signed an agreement to set up special economic zones in both nations for the development of EVs and batteries, backed by private and public funding in a bid to begin the shift from exporting to domestic processing.

A report[xxii] produced in August 2023 by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development noted:

• the potential of African Nations’ mineral wealth to enable them to be key suppliers of automotive parts and components and encouraged them to make deals with automotive and battery producers to acquire technology and knowledge, while engaging in domestic processing to “… avoid being locked into the provision of ‘just’ raw materials, which results in very low-value integration into global supply chains.” 
• the importance of “equal terms of mining contracts and policies [in] catalysing lateral linkages between large-scale mining and local productive industrial development”;
• the important role of national incentives and regional cooperation in helping domestic companies gain competitive advantage in the mining sector.

In April 2024, the UNSG convened an international Pane[xxiii]l to address equity, sustainability and human rights across the value chains of critical energy transition minerals. The Panel was tasked with improving national management of mineral resources to ensure that increased demand for them does not ‘perpetuate commodity dependence, exacerbating geopolitical tensions’; and to help produce ‘globally agreed guidance to ensure responsible, fair and just value chains.’ The Panel’s Report, which was published in September 2024[xxiv] makes a series of recommendations for fairness, transparency, investment, sustainability and human rights, but along the entire minerals value chain, from refining and manufacturing to transport and end-of-use recycling.

The EU has begun to recognize it has an obligation (and a need) to act in this space to seek alternative mineral trade partners to China and Russia (and avoid a risk of supply disruption) and to help African countries benefit from their own raw materials.  In March 2023, the EU unveiled in its Critical Raw Materials Act, which aims to make the bloc less dependent on single suppliers by boosting EU mineral industries as well as offering African supply countries a more equal contractual footing through long-term raw materials and value chain partnerships.

Conclusion

Protectionism is on the rise around the world as the post-second world war political and economic consensus breaks down. Alongside this trend, the energy transition has unleashed a new scramble for green resources.  These two factors come together with particularly noticeable effect in Africa.  The collision of protectionism and the increasing need for access to green resources will impact most parts of the economy.  But it will affect mining companies most of all. The stakes are high, with the world’s major powers competing for resources and influence.  The outcome of this intense competition for resources will determine whether the energy transition is ultimately successful and the worst ravages of climate change can be avoided.  But to succeed, the energy transition must be a just transition – one from which African countries must benefit.    Resource nationalism without the necessary legal, financial and infrastructure investment could be counter-productive for African nations.  But done right, it could attract investment, training, jobs and infrastructure in a way which is genuinely beneficial for African nations and their populations.